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INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly twenty years since Alexander Jason
ignited a national debate on the use of computer animation in
the courtroom.' He had been hired as a ballistics expert by
* Director of Trial Advocacy Programs and Externships, Villanova Uni-
versity School of Law. I thank Villanova University School of Law for its gener-
ous support, the participants of the Villanova Junior Faculty Scholarship series
for their insights and inspiration, and Emily Morales for her excellent research
assistance. I am especially grateful to Leonard Packel for his guidance from
this article's inception through its completion, to Michelle Dempsey for her
thoughtful comments and suggestions on a draft, and to Mariam Koohdary for
her invaluable editorial advice and constant moral support.
1. See, e.g., Computer Animation Used for Re-enactment in Murder Trial,
NEWSBYTES, Feb. 21, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 4958494; Elliott Goldstein,
Videotape Evidence: New Technology, New Uses, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct.
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the prosecution in the high profile murder case of adult enter-
tainment entrepreneur Jim Mitchell.2 The defendant had
been accused of gunning down his brother and business part-
ner, Artie, at Artie's home in Corte Madera, California. The
defense claimed that the shooting was an accident that oc-
curred after the defendant had gone to the house and con-
fronted his brother about the latter's drinking problem.4 But
Jason had a different opinion of what occurred inside the
house. Based on the physical evidence collected from the sce-
ne and the audio recording of a 9-1-1 call made from the
house during the shooting, Jason was confident that he could
reconstruct the event to show that it was not an accident. 5
He worried, however, that he would not be able to explain his
conclusions to the jury.
Concerned that his verbal testimony would be confusing
and boring,6 he created a computer animation to help the jury
understand his conclusions.7 The animation he created be-
28, 1994; Jim Meyer, In and Out of Court: New Trial Related Products - and
Some Others, ABA JOURNAL, June 1992, at 105; Mark I. Pinsky, Jury Out on
High-Tech Courtroom, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at Al; Rorie Sherman, Mov-
ing Graphics: Computer Animation Enters Criminal Cases, 14 NAT'L L. J. 1
(1992).
2. Alan Chu, Sex, Lies, and Computer Animation, SECURITY MANAGEMENT,
Oct. 1, 1992, at 12; Pinksy, supra note 1.
3. Catherine Bowman, SF Porn King Artie Mitchell Slain: His Older
Brother and Business Partner is Arrested in Marin, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Mar. 1, 1991, at Al.
4. Richard C. Paddock, S.F. Porn King Jim Mitchell Guilty in Slaying of
Brother, L.A. TIMES, Feb.. 20, 1992, at A3.
5. Chu, supra note 2. The victim's girlfriend told the police that she was
inside the house when the shooting began and called 9-1-1; the final five shots
could be heard on the recording. See Dan Morain, Pornographer Arrested in
Partner-Brother's Slaying, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A34.
6. In Jason's words:
The complexities of this incident . . . made the written description of
what actually occurred difficult to understand, to visualize .... It is
very difficult to try to explain all the facts verbally. If I started telling
you the details of each shot - the angle and direction of the trajectories,
the location and position of the victim during each shot, and where the
bullets ended up-you'd quickly become confused and probably be fal-
ling asleep by the fourth or fifth shot.
Chu, supra note 2.
7. The People vs Mitchell Computer Animation, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=iburPk37s4Y (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Mitchell Anima-
tion]. See, e.g., 21st Century Forensic Animations, http'J/www.call2lst.com (last
visited Sep. 30, 2009); Demonstratives, Inc., http://www.demonstratives.com/
view-litigation-animations.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); Eyewitness Anima-
tions, http:/eyewitnessanimations.com/samples.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2011);
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gins with a view of the victim lying in his bedroom. The first
three shots are fired toward the bedroom door from the hall-
way.9 The victim stands up and walks into the hallway,
where he is struck in the torso. 10 He ducks into the doorway
of another room." Fifteen seconds elapse. 2 Another bullet
goes through a wall and into the victim's right arm. 3 After
another twenty-eight seconds, the victim peeks out from the
doorway and is struck in the forehead. 4 He collapses to the
floor and dies.' At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
Mitchell guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 16 Although it is
not clear what effect the animation had on the jury's verdict,
attorneys on both sides of the case later commented that the
impact was likely significant. 7
Twenty years later, the use of computer animation in the
courtroom remains one of the most controversial issues in the
law of evidence. Proponents claim that animation is a valu-
able tool that litigants should be allowed to use to illustrate
their arguments to the jury. As one author observed, "If a
Hayes & Associates, http'/www.hayesassoc.corm/what we-do/case-examples
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011); High Impact, Inc., http://www.highimpact.com/ an-
imations/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); Origin Point, Inc.,
http'//www.originpointinc.com/ (follow "Computer Animation" hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 26, 2011); Perspective Media Group, http://www.forensic-
media.com/ forensicgal.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); Trial Image, Inc.,
http://www.trialimagestore.com/medical-animation-samples.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2011).
8. See Mitchell Animation, supra note 7. The animation is noticeably lack-
ing in irrelevant detail. For example, at the beginning of the sequence, the vic-
tim is depicted lying supine in a room within the house. See id. Presumably, he
is lying on a bed, but no bed is depicted, so the victim appears to be suspended a
few feet from the ground. See id.; see also Morain, supra note 5 (discussing that
the victim's girlfriend, who allegedly called 9-1-1 from the same room is not de-
picted at all).
9. Mitchell Animation, supra note 7.
10. Id. (discussing that as the victim is walking down the hall, a beer bottle
is depicted in his right hand, yet the bottle was removed before the animation
was shown to the jury). See Pinsky, supra note 1.
11. Pinsky, supra note 1.
12. Id. (discussing that the amount of time that elapsed between the shots
was significant because the defense had argued that the defendant panicked
and fired off several shots in rapid succession); see also Chu, supra note 2 (dis-
cussing that the time lapse on the animation was intended to rebut this claim).
13. Pinsky, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Chu, supra note 2.
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'picture is worth a thousand words,' then a computer-
generated animation says a thousand words, sings a thou-
sand songs, and paints with a thousand colors all at once."18
Critics warn that computer animations are more likely to
pervert the fact-finding process than they are to enhance it.19
Several courts have expressed concern that computer anima-
tions have such a powerful impact on jurors that they will
forget that the animation is simply a visual representation of
witness testimony.20 Many critics are skeptical that the pur-
ported desire to help jurors understand the evidence is noth-
ing more than an excuse to dazzle them. 21 Wright and Gra-
18. Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the
Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform
and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 161, 190 (2000). Alexan-
der Jason made a similar observation: "If a picture is worth a thousand words,
then an animation can be worth a thousand paragraphs or a thousand pages."
Chu, supra note 2.
19. See, e.g., Adam T. Berkoff, Computer Simulations in Litigation: Are Tel-
evision Generation Jurors Being Misled? 77 MARQ. L. REV. 829, 849-50 (1994)
(discussing the concern that jurors will believe what they see in an animation to
be true in much the same way that they tend to believe that what they see on
television is true); John Selbak, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of
Computer-Generated Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337, 355
(1994) ("P[J]uries may surrender their role as fact-finder by accepting computer
evidence as a factual conclusion."). Selbak also discusses the research of Brian
Stonehill, the director of media studies at Pomona College in Claremont, Cali-
fornia, who hypothesizes that computer animations create "pseudo-memories" of
an event; in other words, jurors will tend to remember the animation as having
witnessed the event itself, rather than someone's contention as to how the event
occurred. Id. at 360-61. See also, e.g., Galves, supra note 18, at 218-19 (argu-
ing that jurors deserve more credit because jurors are accustomed to seeing an-
imations and know better than to assume that what is portrayed on a screen is
the truth). For example, jurors know that animators can show dinosaurs walk-
ing on the earth, but it is unlikely that they believe they are actually witnessing
video footage of dinosaurs. Id. See Mario Borelli, The Computer as Advocate:
An Approach to Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J.
439, 455-56 (1996) ("Jurors are also not easily tricked or persuaded by tactics or
clever rhetoric. They may therefore be perfectly capable of giving proper weight
to a computer display in summation when the judge admonishes them that the
display is not itself evidence.").
20. See, e.g., Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, No. 92-3404, 1994 WL
124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (precluding a computer animation of an
automobile accident based on the concern that jurors may believe what the an-
imation depicted simply because they saw it); State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281,
296 (Minn. 2002) (recognizing that "proposed animations must be carefully
scrutinized" due to computer animation's dramatic power); State v. Farner, 66
S.W.3d 188, 209 (Tenn. 2001) ("[The jury may be so persuaded by [the] life-like
nature [of the computer animation] that it becomes unable to visualize an op-
posing or differing version of the event.").
21. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
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ham, for example, refer to computer animations as "techno-
logical whiz-bang," and "paraphernalia used to Disney-up the
evidence."22
Although the persuasive power of computer animations is
certainly a cause for concern, the more serious danger is the
declining level of scrutiny applied by courts when considering
the admissibility of computer animations, and demonstrative
evidence in general. This declining level of scrutiny is a re-
sult of a failure to understand the true function of demonstra-
tive evidence in the proof process. In the Mitchell case, Alex-
ander Jason understood the value of his animation. Jason
discovered that he could better express his opinions by using
the animation than he could have had he explained his opin-
ions verbally. The animation was more than an illustration
of his testimony; it was his testimony. More than a century
ago, Wigmore made the same observation about demonstra-
tive evidence when he called it "non-verbal testimony."23 The
law has since devolved and demonstrative evidence is no
longer considered testimonial or even substantive evidence.2 4
The prevailing law now allows demonstrative evidence to
serve as an explanation or illustration of other evidence.25 As
a result, witnesses may testify with the use of demonstrative
evidence that they would not otherwise be permitted to say
through verbal testimony because demonstrative evidence is
not subject to the same evidentiary rules as testimonial evi-
dence. And in the case of computer animations, the admissi-
bility standards are even more relaxed. In one case, the court
admitted a computer animation on the theory that it illus-
trated a party's contentions, even though those contentions
were not supported by evidence.26 As advocates are pushing
the envelope with ever more powerful visual displays, courts
seem less and less concerned with the accuracy of what the
displays depict.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5174.1 (Supp. 2011).
22. Id. at § 5471.1, 215 n.33.
23. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 789 (Little, Brown 1904); See also infra notes 53-
59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2006) (discussing
that computer animation was admissible on the theory that it illustrated the
prosecution's theory of the case). See also infra Part II.
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This Article is not critical of the use of computer anima-
tions, or of demonstrative evidence generally. On the con-
trary, demonstrative evidence plays a very important role by
helping witnesses express themselves more effectively. Ra-
ther, this Article criticizes of the misuse of demonstrative ev-
idence to accomplish what cannot be achieved with competent
evidence. This Article calls for testimonial accountability for
demonstrative evidence. Part II begins by tracing the devel-
opment of demonstrative evidence from the first use in Amer-
ican courts more than 150 years ago to the powerful computer
generated exhibits that are becoming increasingly common in
courtrooms today. This part traces the simultaneous decline
in the law governing the admissibility of demonstrative evi-
dence over the last century and a half. As demonstrative evi-
dence became more advanced, the admissibility standards for
demonstrative evidence have become more relaxed. Part III
analyses the impact that these relaxed standards had on the
admissibility of computer animations. Part IV discusses how
to restore testimonial accountability for demonstrative evi-
dence so witnesses will not be able to express through an ex-
hibit what they would not be allowed to say in words.
I. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
Demonstrative evidence is one of two types of nonverbal
evidence-the other type of evidence is commonly referred to
as "real evidence."27 Real evidence consists of objects that
played "an actual or direct part in the incident or transaction
giving rise to the trial."28 It is the gun allegedly possessed by
27. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 213-214 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th
ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK, 6th ed.]. The McCormick treatise uses the
term "demonstrative aid," rather than "demonstrative evidence." See id. Some
add a third category called "documentary evidence" to refer to original docu-
ments, such as a contract or a piece of correspondence, that have some rele-
vance to the case. See, e.g., Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Deriva-
tive Relevance of Demonstrative Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary
Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 979 (1992). Brain & Broderick attempt to
distinguish documentary evidence from real evidence by asserting that "real ev-
idence imparts information first-hand to the trier of fact, whereas documentary
evidence imparts such information only through the medium of a writing or re-
cording." Id. at 979. In my opinion, this is neither a distinction nor a differ-
ence. Documents must be authenticated like any other form of real evidence
and, once authenticated, they impart information first-hand to the trier of fact
just like any other form of real evidence.
28. MCCORMICK, 6th ed., supra note 27, § 213, at 11.
110 [Vol. 52
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the defendant offered to prove barrel length,29 the counterfeit
bills bearing identical serial numbers offered to prove the de-
fendant's knowledge that they were counterfeit," and the
drugs seized from the defendant's motel room.3 1 Demonstra-
tive evidence is all nonverbal evidence that is not real evi-
dence.3 2 It is the model used to show the jury how a scaffold
is constructed,33 the map used in a trespass action to show the
location of boundary lines,34 the photograph used by the
plaintiff to explain the defect in the street that caused him to
fall, 35 and the staggering gait of a police officer showing the
jury how the defendant walked during his field sobriety test. 6
As discussed below, courts have been inconsistent in their as-
sessment of demonstrative evidence and its function in the
proof process.
A. The Evolution of Demonstrative Evidence
Although American courts have permitted the use of de-
monstrative evidence for over 150 years,37 it was not until the
1940's that advocates began to appreciate its true persuasive
power. 38 Much of the credit has gone to Melvin Belli,39 who
29. United States v. Crowell, 559 F.2d 1084, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1976).
30. United States v. Skelley, 501 F.2d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 1974),
31. United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. MCCORMICK, 6th ed., supra note 27, § 214, at 14-15.
33. See Geist v. Rapp, 55 A. 1063, 1063 (Pa. 1903). Accord Davis v. Pacific
Power Co., 40 P. 950, 953 (Cal. 1895) (permitting witness to use iron bar to
show jury approximate size of bar that allegedly injured the plaintiff); Moran
Bros. Co. v. Snoqualmie Falls Power Co., 69 P. 759, 763 (Wash. 1902) (permit-
ting witness to show two wooden models to the jury representing the difference
between a regulator box as designed and a regulator box as manufactured by
the defendant).
34. See Shook v. Pate, 50 Ala. 91 (1873). Accord State v. Lawlor, 9 N.W.
698, 699 (Minn. 1881) (permitting diagrams of layout of rooms); Rippe v. Chi-
cago, D. & M. R. Co., 1876 WL 4246, at *3 (Minn. 1876) (permitting witness to
use plat to explain location of property); Cundiff v. Orms, 7 Port. 58, 58 (Ala.
1938) (allowing surveyor to use his survey not only as substantive proof of
boundary lines, but also "to make his testimony more intelligible to the jury").
35. See Costello v. Kansas City, 219 S.W. 386, 390 (Mo. 1920). Accord State
v. Mitchem, 125 S.E. 190, 190 (N.C. 1924) (allowing photograph of crime scene
to help prosecution witness explain testimony); Com. v. Dreamer, 188 A. 117,
118 (Pa. 1936) (permitting photographs to be admitted in homicide case to help
prosecution explain condition of body and scene of crime).
36. See State v. Anderson, 557 P.2d 795, 797 (Mont. 1976).
37. Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 991-92.
38. Id. at 998.
39. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 21, § 5172; Brain & Broderick, su-
pra note 27, at 998.
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claimed to have an epiphany in 1946 while he was represent-
ing a woman whose leg had been amputated as a result of a
streetcar accident.4  After defense counsel attempted to
minimize the plaintiffs injury by suggesting that she could be
fitted with a prosthetic leg, Belli pulled out a prosthesis,
handed it to the jurors, and asked each of them to "feel the fi-
ne texture of the flesh, to feel the warm blood coursing
through the veins, to move the noiseless joints, to compare
them with the articulating parts of their own knees.'4 In
1980, Belli marveled at how far demonstrative evidence had
come in the previous thirty years.42 According to Belli, the
varieties of demonstrative evidence "are limited only by the
creativity and originality of the trial lawyer's mind and the
trial court's discretion."43 He predicted that "[t]he next 25
years shall be at the very least equally exciting."'
There is no doubt that Belli would be excited by what an
advocate can do with computer animation today. It can pro-
vide varied perspectives and allows jurors see an event from
different points of view.4" It can show the jury an event in re-
al time, or it can speed up, slow down, or stop the action com-
pletely.46 The computer can also highlight one or more as-
pects of the animation to draw the jurors' attention to what
the advocate deems most important.4 7 Like the prosthetic leg
that Belli handed to a jury in 1946, computer animations
bring a case to life.48 As demonstrative exhibits have become
increasingly more powerful, one might expect courts to have
responded by becoming more vigilant about what the exhibits
depict. This has not been the case.
40. See Melvin M. Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate Award,
22 Miss. L.J. 284, 298 (1951).
41. Id. at 299.
42. See Melvin M. Belli, Demonstrative Evidence: Seeing is Believing, 16
TRIAL 70, 73 (1980).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Berkoff, supra note 19, at 849.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Dean A. Morande, A Class of Their Own: Model Procedural
Rules and Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer-Generated "Animations," 61 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1077 (2007).
[Vol. 52
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B. The Devolution of the Law on Demonstrative Evidence
The advancements in demonstrative evidence have coin-
cided with a decline in the law governing its admissibility.
The first courts to encounter demonstrative evidence recog-
nized its value as an alternative means for a witness to ex-
press an idea that was more difficult to express in words.
Demonstrative evidence was considered just as testimonial
and substantive as the witness's use of words. Over time,
however, demonstrative evidence was classified as secondary
to testimonial evidence; its function was to illustrate or ex-
plain substantive evidence. This was a significant shift. De-
monstrative evidence was no longer the subject to the same
evidentiary standards as testimonial evidence. Rather, courts
fashioned admissibility standards specific to demonstrative
evidence. The application of those standards has been prob-
lematic, especially when it comes to the most sophisticated
computer generated exhibits used today. 9
1. Demonstrative Evidence as Nonverbal Testimony
To the first courts that encountered demonstrative evi-
dence, its evidentiary significance was obvious. In Shook v.
Pate,5 ° for example, in an action for trespass to lands, a wit-
ness used a diagram to show the jury the location of the rele-
vant property lines." The court found this perfectly accept-
able:
A witness may as well speak by a diagram, or linear de-
scription, when the thing may be so described, as by
words. It is a common and usual method of pointing out
localities and lines. Even savages resort to it, in lieu of
words, in describing the course of rivers, and the lines of
the sea shores. It is enough if it serves the purpose of the
witness in the explanation of the lines and localities he is
seeking to exhibit. 2
It would have been difficult for the witness to explain the
location of the boundary lines in words. So, rather than tes-
tify in words, he testified by showing the jury a diagram. In
his first evidence treatise, Wigmore acknowledged a "univer-
49. See infra Part II.
50. 50 Ala. 91 (1873).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 91.
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sal judicial concession [that] a map, model, diagram, or pho-
tograph, takes an evidential place only as a non-verbal mode
of expressing a witness' testimony."5 3 Wigmore called it "non-
verbal testimony."54
Nonverbal testimony, according to Wigmore, includes
such visual aids as dramatic communication,55 models, maps,
diagrams, and photographs.56 Wigmore began his discussion
of nonverbal testimony with the observation that "[people do]
not communicate by words alone; and it may occur that words
become inferior to action as a mode of communicating a cor-
rect impression of a scene observed."5 7 Thus, when a witness
uses a model, diagram, or photograph to express a point to
the jury, the witness is merely using an alternative to words
as a means of communication.5" According to Wigmore, "[i]t
would be folly to deny ourselves on the witness stand those
effective media of communication commonly employed at oth-
er times as a superior substitute for words." 9
53. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 790, at 894.
54. Id. at 892.
55. By "dramatic communication," Wigmore was referring to a witness us-
ing his or her own body to communicate a point to the jury. An example is a
witness who uses her own hand to demonstrate the hand motion made by a po-
lice officer to signal a motorist to stop. Id.
56. WIGMORE, supra note 23, §§ 789-798.
57. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 790, at 892. Here, as the word "action" sug-
gests, Wigmore is referring to dramatic communication, but the same point ap-
plies to all forms of nonverbal testimony.
58. Id. at 893.
59. Id. Wigmore presented his nonverbal testimony theory, not as some-
thing of his own creation, but rather a statement of the common law on demon-
strative exhibits. In fact, Wigmore asserted that nonverbal testimony was the
law "by universal judicial concession." Id. at 894. As evidence of this common
law, he quoted the opinions of six mid to late nineteenth century jurists. In one
case, for example, the court observed:
A witness who speaks to personal appearance or identity tells in more
or less detail the minutia thereof as taken in by his eye. What he says
is a description thereof by one mode of signs, by words orally uttered.
If his testimony be written instead of spoken and is offered as a deposi-
tion, it is a description in another mode of signs, by words written; and
the value of that mode, the deposition, depends on the accuracy with
which his words uttered are put into words written. Now if he has be-
fore him a portrait or photograph of the person, and it shows to him a
correct copy of that person, if it produces to his view a correct descrip-
tion, which he testifies is a likeness, why may not that be given to the
jury as a description of the person by the witness in another mode of
signs?
Id. at 894 (quoting Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 478 (N.Y. 1881)).
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When a witness uses a demonstrative display to commu-
nicate something to the jury, the display is just as valuable
substantive evidence as a witness's verbal testimony. Thus,
according to the nonverbal testimony theory, there is no dis-
tinction between substantive evidence and illustrative or de-
rivative evidence. The demonstrative display holds no evi-
dentiary value when it is not used by a witness to
communicate something to the jury. In Wigmore's words, "[i]t
is somebody's testimony, or it is nothing."60
In the first edition of his evidence treatise, published in
1954, McCormick agrees with Wigmore that demonstrative
evidence is substantive testimonial evidence. McCormick
wrote that a photograph is properly admitted as demonstra-
tive evidence if the witness identifies it as a "correct repre-
sentation of [facts relevant to the issue]." 61 He went on to ex-
plain the evidentiary significance of the photograph:
The adjective "illustrative" aptly describes the role of the
picture thus incorporated in the testimony, but it is some-
times used as contrasted with "substantive" evidence. It is
believed that this distinction is groundless, and that the
photograph, as part of the descriptive testimony, is just as
much substantive evidence as the testimony of a witness
describing the features of a scene or object without a pho-
tograph would be. It may be correctly described as both
"illustrative" and "substantive. "62
This reasoning is consistent with Wigmore's nonverbal testi-
mony theory; the witness's use of the photograph is an alter-
native, and likely better, mode of communicating the sub-
stance of the photograph.
Brain and Broderick criticized Wigmore for failing to dis-
tinguish demonstrative evidence from "real" evidence:
While Wigmore did much to classify the distinguishing
characteristics of substantive and demonstrative evidence,
he failed to note that the principal distinction between
demonstrative evidence and substantive real (or testimo-
nial) evidence is in the purpose for which such evidence is
used at trial.63
60. Id. at 893 (emphasis in original).
61. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 181,
AT 387 (11t ed. 1954) [hereinafter MCCORMICK, 1st ed.].
62. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
63. Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 998.
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 115 2012
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
This criticism fails to take into account the important obser-
vation made by Wigmore and eighteenth century courts-
demonstrative evidence is just as "real" as verbal testimony.
Yet Wigmore does make the important distinction be-
tween the exhibits used by a witness to communicate testi-
mony and the exhibits that have some other evidentiary sig-
nificance to the facts in issue, which parallels our modern
distinction between "real evidence" and "demonstrative evi-
dence."64 Wigmore appreciated that one particular exhibit
could have different evidentiary significances depending on
its functions in the trial.65 He uses the example of a map.66
When used by a witness in lieu of words to communicate what
the map depicts, it is nonverbal testimony.67 To be admissi-
ble, it is necessary for the witness to vouch for the map's ac-
curacy.68 Otherwise, the map is just as irrelevant as admit-
tedly inaccurate verbal testimony.69 If, on the other hand, a
witness identifies the map as an item that was stolen, the ev-
identiary character of the map is completely different.7 ° In
that case, the map is not nonverbal testimony describing
what the map depicts. The map could be entirely inaccurate.
71 Nevertheless, the map is relevant because it is an item
that was allegedly stolen.72 Thus, Wigmore's theory does not
extend to all exhibits presented at trial. By "non-verbal tes-
timony," Wigmore was referring to a special category of exhib-
its: those that witnesses use in lieu of words to communicate
something to the jury.73
To illustrate Wigmore's theory, consider the case of a
woman who alleges that her right knee was injured in an au-
tomobile accident and that, as a result of the accident, she
walked with a limp for the next six months. Two years later,
when the case comes to trial, it is important that the woman
communicate to the jury how this injury has affected her abil-
64. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 790, at 893. See also supra notes 27-36 and
accompanying text.
65. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 790, at 893.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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ity to walk. Consider the following alternatives:
* In response to the question, "How did the injury to
your knee affect your ability to walk?" she could simply
say, "I walked with a limp."
* In response to the same question, she could give a far
more detailed answer: "I was unable to bend my right
knee more than fifteen degrees without experiencing
unbearable pain. Therefore, when I walked, I bent my
right knee only slightly, no more than fifteen degrees.
Of course, when I usually walk, I move my right leg
forward on a plane that is perpendicular to the ground.
But, when I bent my right knee slightly, I was unable
to lift my leg high enough to prevent my foot from
dragging on the ground. So to keep my foot from drag-
ging on the ground, I had to swing my right leg away
from my body each time I moved my right leg forward."
* She could draw a bent line on a blackboard and point
to her drawing while saying, "I was able to bend my
knee this much."
* If given a model of a human leg, she could bend the
knee, hold it up for the jury to see, and say, "I was able
to bend my knee this much."
* If given a series of photographs of herself walking dur-
ing the time when her injury affected her range of mo-
tion, she could say, "These photographs fairly and ac-
curately depict how I walked for the first six months
after the accident."
* If permitted to leave the witness stand, she could dem-
onstrate how the injury affected her stride by limping
across the courtroom in front of the jury.
Wigmore would define each of these six alternatives as testi-
mony: the first two examples illustrate verbal testimony,
while the last four demonstrate nonverbal testimony.
In some cases, demonstrative evidence may be useful
even if it is not entirely accurate. Demonstrative evidence
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 117 2012
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
has probative value when used by a witness to communicate a
point to the fact finder, and it may assist the witness for that
purpose despite being inaccurate. For example, a witness
may testify nonverbally by using a photograph even if the
conditions shown on the photograph are different than the
conditions that existed at the relevant time."4 If there are in-
accuracies, it is important that the witness identifies how the
illustration in the photograph is different than what she ac-
tually perceived during the relevant time.75 If the witness
cannot or does not describe the inaccuracies, the photograph
should be excluded. 76
Of course, demonstrative evidence, like verbal testimony,
may be excluded if the court finds that the inaccuracies may
create an unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues that sub-
stantially outweighs their probative value.77 The prejudice is
especially unfair when the demonstrative evidence in ques-
tion has been prepared by the party offering it. There is no
excuse for inaccuracies in prepared exhibits. Moreover, there
is a higher risk that jurors will believe that the depiction in a
prepared exhibit is accurate: when the preparer of the exhibit
has full control over its contents, it is reasonable for jurors to
conclude that the preparer had good reason for including eve-
rything that it contains.
2. Demonstrative Evidence as Illustrative of Verbal
Testimony
Sometime during the 1900's, the nonverbal testimony
theory gave way to the much different theory that demonstra-
tive evidence serves to illustrate or explain other evidence.
This shift in demonstrative evidence theory is apparent when
comparing the treatment of demonstrative evidence in the
74. See, e.g., Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 220 F.2d 82, 88-89 (8th Cir.
1955). Photographs of the accident scene are admissible even though they de-
picted chalk marks on the roadway not present at the time of the accident. Id.
Bradshaw v. State, 323 S.E.2d 253, 253-54 (Ga. App. 1984). Photographs of
burglarized office are admissible as demonstrative evidence even though there
were changes in the appearance of the office since the time of the burglary. Id.
75. See, e.g., Een, 220 F.2d at 88-89.
76. See, e.g., Allemand v. Zip's Trucking Co., Inc., 552 So.2d 1023, 1029 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1989). Photographs of the scene of an automobile accident are prop-
erly excluded where there was no testimony as to how the scene changed be-
tween the time of the accident and the time the photographs were taken. Id.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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first edition of McCormick's evidence treatise to the subse-
quent treatment in later editions. Although McCormick's
treatment of demonstrative evidence in the first edition was
consistent with Wigmore's nonverbal testimony theory, the
treatment of demonstrative evidence in the second edition,
published in 1972, is much different:
It is today increasingly common to encounter the offer of
tangible items ... which are... tendered for the purpose
of rendering other evidence more comprehensible to the
trier of fact. [Examples of this type frequently] include
models, maps, photographs, charts, and drawings. If an
article is offered for these purposes, rather than as real or
original evidence, its specific identity or source is gener-
ally of no significance whatever. Instead, the theory justi-
fying admission of these exhibits requires only that the
item be sufficiently explanatory or illustrative of relevant
testimony in the case to be of potential help to the trier of
fact.78
Although McCormick used the term "illustrative" in the first
edition, the term "illustrative" is used differently here. Ra-
ther than being illustrative of the facts in issue, the photo-
graph is now seen as illustrative of the verbal testimony of
the witness that authenticates the photograph for the jury.
The notion that demonstrative evidence is illustrative of
verbal testimony has posed a problem for evidence scholars
seeking to explain its role in the proof process. Brain and
Broderick, for example, theorize that demonstrative evidence
has a "derivative relationship with material facts."79 It func-
tions differently from so-called substantive evidence. Where-
as substantive evidence has the capacity to make a relevant
factual proposition more or less likely,80 demonstrative evi-
dence does not have the ability to move the evidentiary ball
forward. In other words, demonstrative evidence is not a
piece of evidence offered to prove or disprove a factual propo-
sition. 1 It is evidence offered to illuminate the substantive
pieces of evidence and make the substantive evidence more
78. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, § 212 at 528 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972), quoted in Brain &
Broderick, supra note 27, at 1008.
79. Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 975.
80. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
81. See Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 973-75.
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comprehensible to the jury.82
The notion that demonstrative evidence has a "derivative
relationship with material facts" creates a dilemma for Brain
and Broderick. According to the plain meaning of Rule 401 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, an exhibit that merely illus-
trates other evidence fails to satisfy the definition of relevant
evidence.83 Indeed, Brain and Broderick have concluded that
demonstrative evidence is not "relevant evidence" as defined
by Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence' because it does
not make any fact of consequence to the action more or less
probable. 85 To the extent that demonstrative evidence helps
the jury understand substantive evidence, it "secondarily
augments the perceived likelihood that a fact of consequence
either occurred or did not occur."86 They proceed to elaborate
on how this process of secondary augmentation occurs:
After viewing a demonstrative exhibit, jurors may believe
in the existence or nonexistence of a fact with more certi-
tude than without such a view. Indeed, that is largely the
purpose of demonstrative proof in litigation. This increase
in juror belief, however, stems from an increased apprecia-
tion or understanding of the other evidence to which the
demonstrative proof relates. In other words, it is a secon-
dary effect of the purpose for which the demonstrative dis-
play was introduced. This increased juror belief does not
flow from any increase or decrease in the probable exis-
tence of the relevant, underlying fact.8
To address this anomaly, which they contend inadvertently
excludes demonstrative evidence from the universe of rele-
vant evidence, Brain and Broderick propose a revised Rule
401 designed to bring demonstrative exhibits within the defi-
nition of "relevant evidence." 8 Their proposed revision adds a
82. Id.
83. Id. at 975-76.
84. Rule 401 provides that "relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would without the
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 401.
85. See Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 975-76.
86. Id. at 975.
87. Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 1018 n.210.
88. Id. at 1019. The editors of the 6th edition of McCormick's treatise con-
tend that Brain and Broderick's revised Rule 401 is not necessary. See
MCCORMICK, 6th ed., supra note 27, § 212 n.5. The treatise points to the Advi-
sory Committee Notes to Rule 401, which interpret the phrase "fact of conse-
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second, alternative definition to Rule 401: "evidence that ac-
curately and equitably explains, illustrates, or clarifies other
admissible evidence." 9
Brain and Broderick are not alone in questioning wheth-
er demonstrative evidence is relevant under Rule 401. Ac-
cording to the standard jury instructions adopted in several
federal circuits, demonstrative evidence-often referred to as
"illustrative exhibits"-is not evidence.9 ° This is not an un-
reasonable conclusion when starting from the false premise
that demonstrative evidence merely illustrates the testimony
of the witness who uses it. If, according to Rule 401, relevant
evidence makes the existence of a fact of consequence to the
action more or less probable, one can infer that "evidence"
would include everything that makes any fact more or less
probable, regardless of whether the fact is of consequence to
the determination of the action. By definition, exhibits that
merely assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence
do not make any facts more or less probable. Therefore, if the
exhibit is not evidence, there is no need to consider its rele-
vance. Rather, the question is whether the court should allow
the witness to use the exhibit under Rule 611(a)(1), which
grants discretion to the trial court to manage the presenta-
tion of evidence. 91
quence" broadly to include "evidence 'admitted as an aid in understanding."'
Id. (citing 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5174 (2008)).
89. Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 1019.
90. PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR., 7.12 (6th Cir. 2005) ("This material [refer-
ring to summaries, charts, drawings, etc.] is not itself evidence and must not be
considered as proof of any facts."); MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR., 4.11 at 114 (8th
Cir. 2007) ("Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you in order to
help explain the facts disclosed by the books, records, or other underlying evi-
dence in the case. Those charts or summaries are used for convenience. They
are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts. If they do not correctly reflect
the facts shown by the evidence in the case, you should disregard these charts
and summaries and determine the facts from the books, records or other under-
lying evidence."); PATTERN JURY INSTR., 2.8 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Exhibit [describe]
is an illustration. It is a party's [description or picture or model] to describe
something involved in this trial. If your recollection of the evidence differs from
the exhibit, rely on your recollection."); FED. CIV. JURY INSTR., 1.24 at 32 (7th
Cir. 2005). This is similar to Fifth Circuit instruction; however, comments re-
peatedly use phrase "demonstrative evidence." Id.
91. Brain & Broderick, supra note 27, at 1017. The Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 611(a)(1) explains that the Rule "restates in broad terms the power
and obligation of the judge as developed under common law principles. It covers
such concerns as . . . the use of demonstrative evidence . . . ." FED. R. EVID.
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But does demonstrative evidence merely explain, illus-
trate, or clarify other admissible evidence? Or does it impart
additional information to the jury beyond what has already
been conveyed by the "other evidence"? The answer is obvi-
ous, considering the verbal testimony that ordinarily accom-
panies a demonstrative exhibit. In most cases, there is very
little, if any, "other evidence" that accompanies the demon-
strative exhibit, aside from the testimony required to lay the
foundation. Here is a typical example:
Q. Mr. Doe, have you ever been at the intersection of
North and Clark Streets?
A. Yes.
Q. How many times have you been there?
A. About 50 times.
Q. Are you familiar with that intersection as it looked
on December 13, 2000?
A. Yes, I am.
[Counsel marks exhibit, shows it to opposing counsel, and
shows it to the witness.]
Q. I show you what has been marked as Plaintiffs
Exhibit #1 and ask you to examine it. (Witness does
so.) Do you recognize the scene in that photograph?
A. Yes.
Q. What scene is shown in that photograph?
A. It shows the intersection of North and Clark Streets.
Q. Mr. Doe, does Plaintiffs Exhibit #1 fairly and
accurately show that intersection as it appeared on
December 13, 2000?
A. Yes sir, it does.92
At this point, counsel has laid sufficient foundation to enter
the demonstrative exhibit in evidence.93
According to the prevailing theory of demonstrative evi-
dence, the purpose of Exhibit #1 is to help the jury under-
stand the witness's verbal testimony. One would be hard
pressed, however, to identify the verbal testimony within the
611(a) (advisory committee's note).
92. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 185, 185-86 (7th ed., 2007).
93. See id. (assuming that the jurisdiction allows demonstrative evidence to
be admitted).
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witness's statements. The witness gave no description of the
intersection apart from the names of the streets. The jurors
understanding of the intersection is entirely based on the
photograph. The witness has offered no verbal testimony
from which the jurors could understand the configuration of
the intersection. Thus, in this example, the photograph fails
to satisfy the traditional definition of demonstrative evidence
because it does not help the jurors understand other evidence.
The same is true even when the witness uses the photo-
graph while verbally explaining the appearance of what is
depicted. After laying the foundation set forth above, counsel
may have the witness use the photograph to explain the loca-
tion of people and objects that were present at the relevant
time:
Q. Using Plaintiffs Exhibit #1, would you show the jury
where you were standing when the accident
occurred?
A. Yes, I was standing right here [witness points to
photograph].
Q. Would you write your initials on the photograph
where you just pointed?
A. [Witness writes her initials on the photograph.]94
Here, the witness's verbal testimony does not help the ju-
ry understand where she was standing at the time of the ac-
cident. Her testimony is her nonverbal act of pointing to a
spot on the photograph. Thus, the photograph does not help
the jury understand the witness's verbal testimony. It pro-
vides information in addition to the information provided by
the verbal testimony. The witness's use of the photograph
provided more evidence tending to prove the truth of her as-
sertion that she was in a position to see the car accident.
As this example illustrates, no piece of demonstrative ev-
idence merely explains, illustrates, or clarifies other admitted
evidence. Every time a witness uses demonstrative evidence,
the witness communicates something in addition to what the
witness has said, if for no other reason than providing an al-
ternative means of communication. Take a photograph for
example. It is impossible to express in words everything that
94. This is my own extension of Mauet's illustration. Mauet discusses
"[h]ow to use exhibits" and provides his own illustrations. See id. at 243-49.
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 123 2012
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
a photograph depicts because words can never describe an
image the same way as a photograph. Thus, even if the ver-
bal testimony were so elaborate that it covered every detail of
the photograph, the photograph is still further evidence be-
cause it necessarily conveys the information in a different
manner.
The notion that demonstrative evidence is not testimo-
nial has serious consequences. It means that demonstrative
evidence is no longer subject to the same rules of evidence
that apply to verbal testimony. When a witness offers a pic-
ture in lieu of the thousand words it would take to describe
what it shows, there is no inquiry into whether each of those
thousand words would have been admissible. Demonstrative
evidence is not subject to the evidentiary burdens that apply
to verbal testimony. As a result, courts have been forced to
create an artificial rule in an effort to ensure the reliability of
demonstrative evidence: the demonstrative evidence must be
a "fair and accurate" depiction. This is a poor substitute for
the rules that apply to testimonial evidence.
Suppose that the photograph in the example above de-
picts a streetlight on the southeast corner of North and Clark
Streets, but the witness cannot recall whether the light was
there at the relevant time. The photograph is still admitted
upon a showing that the photograph is generally a fair and
accurate representation of the intersection at the relevant
time, even though the proponent cannot establish that the
witness providing the foundation for the exhibit has personal
knowledge of the light. To the extent that the witness cannot
account for something in the photograph, cross-examination
provides the proper remedy and it is a question of weight, not
admissibility.9 5 Thus, the illustrative purposes theory has the
serious consequence of allowing a witness to communicate
something by photograph that the witness could not say in
words.
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPUTER ANIMATIONS
Most courts consider computer animations to be a form of
demonstrative evidence, functioning as explanations or illus-
trations of other evidence.96 Although courts do not subject
95. See, e.g., Roland v. Langlois, 945 F.2d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1991).
96. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 139 (Cal. App. 4th 1997);
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animations to the same evidentiary safeguards that pertain
to testimonial evidence, they tend to apply the same rules de-
signed to insure reliability of other forms of demonstrative ev-
idence. For example, the animation must be a "fair and accu-
rate" representation of the evidence it purports to explain.97
Several courts have excluded animations depicting images
that are unsupported by the evidence.9" Unlike speculative
verbal testimony, however, which is per se inadmissible,99
speculative computer animations tend to be excluded on the
grounds that they create an unfair prejudice. 100
Nevertheless, treating computer animations as non-
testimonial demonstrative evidence has led to some confusing
legal analyses and questionable, if not obviously erroneous,
results. Federal courts considering the admissibility of com-
puter animations have analogized them to recordings of ex-
periments used to demonstrate the scientific principles un-
derlying the expert opinion.' 01 If the experiment is merely a
State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 293 (Minn. 2002); People v. McHugh, 124
Misc. 2d 559, 560 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Dunkle v. State, 139 P.3d 228, 247
(Okla. Crim. 2006); Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 535 (S.C. 2000); Sommer-
vold v. Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 738 (S.D. 1994); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d
188, 208-10 (Tenn. 2001).
97. Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 209 (emphasis added). See also Dunkle, 139 P.3d
at 247. Further defined as "a correct representation of the object portrayed, or
• . . a fair and accurate representation of the evidence to which it relates." Id.
See also Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2006). See also
Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 536. The animation must be "fair and accurate representa-
tion of the evidence to which it relates." See also Sommervold, 518 N.W.2d at
738 ("[The] animation must fairly and accurately reflect the oral testimony of
the witness."); Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 209 ("[The] proponent must further estab-
lish that the computer animation is a fair and accurate depiction of the event it
purports to portray.").
98. See, e.g., Dunkle, 139 P.3d at 250 (holding that the trial court erred in
admitting an animation that depicted the position of the victim's body and the
distance between the body and the gun, where the evidence did not support
those depictions); Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 295 (facial expressions and move-
ments of shooter not supported by the evidence); Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 538 (posi-
tion of car inconsistent with evidence); Sommervold, 518 N.W.2d at 738 (speed
of bicycles, lighting conditions, location of injuries inconsistent with evidence).
Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 210 (relative position of cars not supported by evidence or
competent scientific opinion).
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. See, e.g., Dunkle, 139 P.3d at 250; Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 538; Sommer-
vold, 518 N.W.2d at 738; Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 209 ("If a computer animated
portrayal is inaccurate, its probative value decreases and the likelihood that it
will be subject to exclusion under Rule 403 increases.").
101. See, e.g., Altman v. Bobcat Co., 349 F. App'x 758, 764 (3d Cir. 2009);
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 424-25 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing
HeinOnline  -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 125 2012
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
demonstration of scientific principles in the abstract, it is not
required "to reflect conditions substantially similar to those
at issue in the trial.""2 If, however, the experiment is in-
tended "to recreate events at the focus of the trial," the ex-
periment must be performed under conditions that are "sub-
stantially similar to the actual events."
10 3
This analogy is faulty because animations, unlike simu-
lations, are not experiments designed to generate results un-
der variable conditions.'0 4 Rather, the animation is intended
to depict a result that the expert has already determined
without the aid of the animation software. To make matters
worse, courts tend to find that animations are not intended to
be re-creations, despite the fact that they obviously depict the
people, places, and events at issue in the trial.'05 Because the
animation need not be substantially similar to the actual
events, there is little to no scrutiny over what it depicts.
0 6
Whether the animation is inconsistent with the evidence is a
question of weight, not admissibility.0 7 Opposing counsel can
address any inconsistencies during cross-examination of the
expert. 08
Because of the lack of scrutiny over the contents of com-
puter animations, experts have been allowed to resolve dis-
puted facts by making assumptions even when there are in-
sufficient facts or data to produce an admissible expert
opinion. The animation in Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg,109 for
example, was the result of numerous choices that resolved
conflicting eyewitness and expert testimony. Hinkle involved
Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1984)); Jones v.
Kearfott Guidance and Navigation Corp., 1998 WL 1184107, at *3 (D.N.J.
1998); Datskow v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors Aircraft Prod., 826 F. Supp. 677,
685-86 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
102. Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 424. Cf Altman, 349 at 764; Jones, 1998 WL at *3;
Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 686.
103. Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 424-25.
104. A "computer animation" simply illustrates the conclusions that the ex-
pert has reached independent of the computer program. With a "simulation" or
"computer model," the computer program generates the result based on the var-
iables provided. See Galves, supra note 18, at 180-85.
105. See, e.g., Altman, 349 F. App'x at 764; Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 425 (animation
depicting defendant shooting plaintiffs decedent); Jones, 1998 WL at *3.
106. See, e.g., Altman, 349 F. App'x at 764; Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 425; Jones,
1998 WL at *3.
107. Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 686.
108. Altman, 349 F. App'x at 763-64.
109. 81 F.3d 416 (4th Cir. 1996).
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a police standoff that ended when the plaintiffs' decedent, Bea
Wilson, was shot to death."' When police arrived, Wilson
was inside his apartment brandishing a shotgun."' Wilson's
son, Adam, was also inside." 2 The police convinced Wilson to
let Adam out of the apartment." 3 After Adam left, the door
was left slightly open and the police officers were able to see
Wilson inside. 114 Sometime thereafter, one of the police offi-
cers, Officer Lake, shot Wilson through the open door. 115 The
circumstances of the shooting were in dispute. The plaintiffs
claimed that Wilson was shot in the back without provoca-
tion, whereas the defendants contended that Wilson was shot
in the chest after he raised his gun toward the officers.
116
At trial, the defense played a computer animation pre-
pared by "Forensic Animation Technologist" Alexander Ja-
son." 7 The animation showed Officer Lake shooting Wilson
in the chest as Wilson was raising his gun toward the door-
way where Officer Lake was positioned. 118 According to the
Court of Appeals, the animation "showed how the officers'
version of the event was consistent with the physical evidence
,,119
The court did not mention or address the plaintiffs' con-
tention that there were several discrepancies between the an-
imation and other evidence, including testimony by defense
witnesses. The first discrepancy involved the location of Wil-
son's body at the time of the shooting.120 Officer Lake, along
with another police officer at the scene, testified that Wilson
was at or near the door to the apartment with the shotgun ex-
tending through the doorway.' 2 ' A defense expert (not Ja-
son), 2 2 however, concluded that Wilson was at least six feet
110. Id. at 419.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 424.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Brief for Appellant at 40-41, Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d
416 (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-1925).
121. Id. at 41.
122. Id. The expert is not identified in the court opinion.
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inside the apartment at the time he was shot.123 The plain-
tiffs argued that the animation was not consistent with either
alternative because it depicted Wilson five feet from the door
when he was shot.124 According to the plaintiffs, Jason was
unable to provide any calculations to justify his conclusion re-
garding Wilson's location as reflected in the animation.
125
The second inconsistency related to the testimony of a second
police officer, Officer Alonso, who claimed that he could not
see Wilson before the shooting.126 According to the plaintiffs,
the animation depicted Wilson passing through Officer
Alonso's field of vision before Officer Lake fired his gun."'
The third inconsistency involves the timing between shots
fired by Officer Lake and Wilson. 2' The animation showed
Officer Lake firing first, striking Wilson in the chest, Wilson
spinning around, and then Wilson firing his gun into the back
wall of the apartment. 129 This sequence, according to the
plaintiffs, was inconsistent with the accounts of several wit-
nesses who heard only one shot, and with the testimony of po-
lice officers, who claimed that both Officer Lake's gun and
Wilson's gun were fired simultaneously.13 °
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged the plain-
tiffs' contention that the animation "failed to reflect condi-
tions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the
shooting,' ' 31 the court did not address any of the alleged in-
consistencies between the evidence and the animation.132 The
court found that the animation was not a re-creation and
therefore it was not required to reflect conditions substan-
tially similar to the conditions that existed at the time of the
shooting. 133 Notwithstanding the alleged discrepancies, the
court noted that "the jury here fully understood this anima-
tion was designed merely to illustrate [defendants'] version of
the shooting and to demonstrate how that version was consis-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 40.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 41-42.
127. Id. at 42.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 42-43.
130. Id.
131. Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 424.
132. See Hinkle, 81 F.3d 416.
133. Id. at 425.
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tent with the physical evidence." 34 The court did not address
plaintiffs' contention that certain conclusions depicted in Ja-
son's animation had no scientific basis.135 Nor did the court
identify Jason's expert opinions, let alone discuss whether the
animation fairly and accurately illustrated those opinions.'36
It is not clear whether Jason would have been permitted to
testify verbally to the conclusions shown in his animation.13 7
The court was satisfied that the animation served as an illus-
tration of the defendants' contentions, rather than a repre-
sentation of a competent expert opinion. 38
Federal courts have continued to apply a relaxed stan-
dard for the admissibility of expert opinions expressed by ani-
mation, rather than by verbal testimony. In 2009, the Third
Circuit applied the same test used in Hinkle in Altman v.
Bobcat Co.' 39 The plaintiffs in Altman alleged that the defec-
tive design of the backhoe's operator compartment caused the
operator to accidently engage the backhoe's control lever with
his knee. 40 To support this claim, the plaintiffs presented a
computer animation that purportedly showed how such an
accident would have been less likely if the operator compart-
ment been designed differently.' On appeal, the defendants
enumerated seven aspects of the animation that were unsup-
ported by the evidence, including the size of the operator, the
manner in which the operator inadvertently engaged the con-
trol lever, and the amount of force required to activate the
lever. 142 Finding that the animation was not intended to be a
re-creation of the accident, the Court of Appeals held that it
was not error to admit the animation despite the inconsisten-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. The animation may well have illustrated an admissible opinion
by Jason even if it was not consistent with some evidence. His opinion may
have been simply that it was possible for Wilson to have been facing the door
when he was shot, then spun around before firing his own gun. If other evi-
dence conflicted with that opinion, it would have gone to the weight, not the
admissibility.
138. Id.
139. 349 F. App'x 758 (3d Cir. 2009).
140. Id. at 760.
141. Id. at 763.
142. Brief for Appellant, at 38-39, Altman v. Bobcat Co. 349 F. App'x 758
(3d Cir. 2009) (No. 94-1925).
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cies."' As with the animation in Hinkle, it appears that the
animation in Altman depicted factual inferences supporting a
case theory as opposed to scientific conclusions admissible as
evidence. Cross-examination was not an effective remedy be-
cause the jury should not have seen the animation in the first
place. Suppose the expert had testified verbally to an opinion
that the control lever could have been engaged with a simple
bump of the knee. It should not be the opposing party's obli-
gation to elicit an admission on cross-examination that the
opinion is not based on sufficient facts or data. It is a ques-
tion of admissibility not weight. 14 4 The opinion should not be
offered in the first place.
In Commonwealth v. Serge,45 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania expressly approved the use of a computer ani-
mation to illustrate not only the opinion of an expert but also
the party's theory of the case. The defendant in Serge shot
and killed his wife.146 He admitted that he shot her, but
claimed that he did so in self-defense after she approached
him with a knife. 147 The prosecution contended that the de-
fendant moved his wife's body after the shooting and planted
a knife on the floor next to her body to support his story of
self-defense. 4 ' To support this theory, the prosecution pre-
sented a computer animation showing the location and rela-
tive positions of both the defendant and the victim when each
of the three shots was fired and the path of each bullet. 4 9
The prosecution's experts had formed opinions on these sub-
jects without the use of the computer.150 The animation
showed that the defendant fired the first shot while the vic-
tim was facing away from him and the bullet entered the vic-
tim's lower back.' 51 Next, the animation shows the second
143. Altman, 349 F. App'x at 764. In fact, the court noted, with approval,
that the District Court instructed the jury that there were certain discrepancies
between the evidence and the event as depicted in the animation. Id.
144. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 n.10
(1993)) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2778-79 (1987) (dis-
cussing that proponent of expert testimony has burden to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that expert is qualified to give opinion).
145. 896 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2006).
146. Id. at 1173.
147. Id. at 1175.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1179-80.
151. DVD: 21st Century Forensic Animations, Demo Version 18 (21st Cen-
[Vol. 52
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shot missing the victim entirely'2 When the third shot was
fired, the victim was on her knees.1 ' The bullet entered her
upper right arm, went through her torso, and exited from her
left side (see Figure 1)." 4 The last image is of the victim lying
on the floor with a knife on the floor next to her,; the knife was
not shown at any prior point in the animation.1 '}
Figure 1. Image from the computer anination in Co( trovwealth ?.
Serge, depicting the prosecution's theory on the relative positions of" 'he de--
fendant and the victim when the second shot struck the vi tim. r
The defendant enumerated six aspects of the animation
that were unsupported by evidence."" Most significant was
the appearance of the knife in the final scene (see Figure 2).
Although the court discussed evidence that appeared to sup-
port most of the depictions complained of, the court made no
attempt to explain how the evidence supported an expert
opinion that the victim was not holding a knife when the de-
tury 1'orensic Animations 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Forensic An-
imations].
152, Id.
153. Id.
154, I.
155. Id.
156. Forensic Animations, supra note 150.
157. Serge, 896 A.2d at 1180.
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fendant shot her.158 Rather, the court justified the depiction
of a defenseless victim as being consistent with the prosecu-
tion's "theory of the case. '"159 Thus, no witness, expert or oth-
erwise, was held accountable for the conclusion depicted in
the animation, that the victim was not brandishing a knife at
the time the defendant shot her. And no witness, other than
the defendant, could have provided competent testimony on
the subject. No one had personal knowledge as to whether
she had a knife in her hand.1 60 And there was not sufficient
facts or data to for an expert witness to form a competent sci-
entific opinion on the subject. 61 Although the prosecution
was entitled to argue in closing that the victim did not have a
knife in her hand, the prosecution should not have been al-
lowed to use an exhibit to present that argument during its
case in chief.'62 To make matters worse, before showing the
animation to the jurors, the court told them that they were
about to see "a graphic depiction, or illustration, of an opinion
that an expert has already formed based upon his or her own
independent investigation, computations, and analysis. '"163
This left the unfortunate misimpression that the experts had
concluded that the victim did not have a knife in her hand at
the time of the shooting.
158. Id. at 1180-81.
159. Id. at 1182.
160. See PA. R. EVID. 602 (identical to Fed. R. Evid. 602).
161. See, e.g., Zeigler v. Simplex Found. Co., 77 A. 239, 240 (Pa. 1910).
162. See, e.g., Master-Halco, Inc. v. Scilla, Dowling, & Natarelli, LLC, 2010
WL 1553784, *1-3 (D.Conn. 2010).
163. Serge, 896 A.2d at 1186.
132 [Vol. 52
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Figure 2. Image from the computer animation in Common alth .
Serge depicting the victim on the floor after the shooting.G4 The knife visi-
ble on the floor next to the victim was not present in the victim's hand or
elsewhere during the shooting (see Figure 1).
This misapplication of evidence principles to the admis-
sion of computer animations opens the door to abuses that
can have dramatic negative consequences to the party against
whom the animation is offered. Litigants can use a computer
animation to make an end run around their burdens under
the Rules of Evidence. Their experts can offer unscientific
opinions through an animation that they would never be able
to offer through verbal testimony. To allow litigants to dis-
play computer animations for the purpose of illustrating their
theories of the case is tantamount to allowing counsel to ar-
gue to the jury in the middle of their case-in-chief. As demon-
strative evidence continues to evolve, the argumentative use
of them will continue to undermine our adversary system.
164, Id.
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III. TESTIMONIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MODERN
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
As demonstrative evidence becomes increasingly more
persuasive, it is very important that it be subject to the ap-
propriate evidentiary standards. Demonstrative evidence is
nonverbal testimony and, as such, should be held to the same
admissibility standards as other testimonial evidence. Liti-
gants must have the same opportunity to challenge testimony
conveyed by way of animation that they have to challenge tes-
timony offered verbally. Moreover, proponents of demonstra-
tive evidence must be held to the same burdens as proponents
of verbal testimony. There are several challenges to the ad-
mission of demonstrative evidence that should be considered.
Each is discussed below.
A. Speculation
The prohibition against speculation is easily enforced
when the demonstrative exhibit is offered as the nonverbal
testimony of a lay witness. Rule 602 provides that a witness
may testify only to matters of which the witness has personal
knowledge. 165 The burden is on the proponent of the testi-
mony to establish evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the witness has personal knowledge. 166 Applying this Rule to
nonverbal testimony, the proponent must establish that the
witness has personal knowledge of everything depicted in the
demonstrative evidence. If the proponent fails to meet that
burden, the portions of the demonstrative evidence that are
not supported by the witness's personal knowledge must be
redacted before the demonstrative evidence is displayed. It is
a question of admissibility, not weight. Because Rule 602
places this burden squarely on the proponent, it is not appro-
priate to expect the opposition to identify on cross-
examination those aspects of the demonstrative evidence not
supported by the witness's personal knowledge. A witness
vouches for the contents of the demonstrative evidence in its
entirety, just as the witness vouches for the veracity of every
word of verbal testimony.
Speculation is problematic, however, when dealing with a
demonstrative exhibit used to illustrate the opinions of ex-
165. FED. R. EVID. 602.
166. Id.
[Vol. 52
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perts-as experts are not required to have personal knowl-
edge of the facts or data underlying their opinions.'67 Usually
an animation offered to illustrate an expert's opinion consists
entirely of information of which the witness has no personal
knowledge. Notwithstanding the rule permitting experts to
opine, the expert's testimony must still be "based upon suffi-
cient facts or data."16 The burden is on the proponent of the
evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
expert opinion is admissible. 69 Many computer animations
run afoul of this rule. No matter how much evidence exists,
there is never enough to fill in every detail necessary to com-
plete the animation. The expert (or the animator) must make
assumptions to fill in the blanks. For example, the defense in
the Mitchell case challenged the animation prepared by the
prosecution's ballistics expert because it was based in part on
the expert's assumptions. 7 ' Although the evidence supported
the conclusion that there were a total of eight shots fired, the
sequence of those shots was a "guess," according to the de-
fense.17" ' Such assumptions seem to be harmless, but there
is no way of knowing the extent to which they may inadver-
tently influence the jury.
Other assumptions are not so arbitrary and do not seem
so harmless. There are often disputed facts that cannot be
resolved by expert opinion, but nevertheless must be depicted
one way or another in the animation. Of course, the choice is
made in favor of the party offering the animation. In the
Mitchell case, the question of whether the victim was holding
anything in his hands was in dispute.'72 The prosecution's
167. See FED. R. EVID. 702. According to Rule 702, an expert "may testify...
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon suffi-
cient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case." Id.
168. Id. See also Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico, S.A., v. Pepsi Cola
Co., 650 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[A]n expert's testimony must
be excluded if it is 'speculative or conjectural."').
169. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.10 (citing Bourjaily v. United States,
107 S. Ct. 2775, 2778-79 (1987)) (discussing that the proponent of expert testi-
mony has burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that expert is
qualified to give opinion).
170. See Claire Cooper, When Justice Starts Watching Videos: Computer An-
imation Newest Way to Make Point in Courtroom, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan.
4, 1993, at Al.
171. Id.
172. See Pinsky, supra note 1.
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experts could not determine, through physical evidence or
otherwise, whether the victim was holding anything and, if
so, how he was holding it.'73 The animator had to make a
choice-depict an object in his hand or not depict an object in
his hand-and either choice was problematic. Having neither
personal knowledge nor sufficient facts or data to form a sci-
entific opinion on the subject, the expert would not have been
permitted to answer that question with verbal testimony. For
that reason, he should not have been permitted to answer
that question with nonverbal testimony in the form of a com-
puter animation.'74
Similarly, in Serge, the defense contended that the de-
fendant shot the victim in self-defense after she charged at
him with a knife. 75 Although there was no evidence as to
whether she was holding a knife at the time of the shooting,'76
the prosecution offered a computer animation that depicted
the victim empty-handed at the time she was shot.177 At the
end of the animation, after the victim had already collapsed
to the ground, a knife appears on the floor next to her.7 8 Al-
though unsupported by the evidence, the appearance of the
knife for the first time at the end of the sequence was consis-
tent with the prosecution's case theory that the defendant
planted the knife after the shooting to support his claim of
self-defense. 179 The absence of the knife during the shooting
was not an arbitrary and harmless choice by the animator. It
was a deliberate choice made to ensure that the animation re-
inforced the prosecution's theory that the victim was un-
armed at the time of the shooting. No testifying witness was
required to account for that choice and testify under oath that
the depiction of the unarmed victim was a fair and accurate
representation of how she appeared to the defendant when he
fired his gun.' Nevertheless, the jurors saw a reenactment
173. Id.
174. The victim was shown holding a beer bottle in his right hand as he is
walking out of the bedroom (see Figure 6). Mitchell Animation, supra note 7.
The bottle was removed before the animation was shown to the jury. Pinsky,
supra note 1.
175. Serge, 896 A.2d at 1175.
176. Id. at 1181.
177. See Forensic Animations, supra note 150.
178. See id.
179. See Serge, 896 A.2d at 1181.
180. In its instructions to the jury before showing the animation, the Court
stated that the two experts had testified that "the computer-generated anima-
136 [Vol. 52
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of the defendant shooting an unarmed woman and were told
that it was prepared to help them understand the experts'
opinions on how the shooting occurred.'
In his concurring opinion in Serge, Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court Justice Castille warned that animations may be
overkill, implying that there should be a preference for "old
fashioned means, such as testimony and diagrams" when they
would be useful to the jury in understanding the expert tes-
timony.'82 Although he did not elaborate on the implications
of his observation, he appeared to be advocating a rule of
preference for the least sophisticated medium necessary to
assist the jury in understanding the testimony. This is not an
attack on computer animation as a medium, instead Justice
Castille criticizes the desire to include every detail to make
the animation as realistic as possible. The more detailed the
animation, the greater the need for arbitrary assumptions.'83
tion ... is a fair and accurate illustration of the opinions that they formed as to
how this shooting allegedly occurred." Serge, 896 A.2d at 1186.
181. This is part of what the court explained to the jury:
You heard testimony from Dr. Gary Ross and Trooper Brad Beach that
the computer-generated animation, which will now be shown to you, is
a fair and accurate illustration of the opinions that they formed as to
how this shooting allegedly occurred. You also heard this witness de-
scribe how he produced the three-dimensional drawings with computer
software to depict those opinions, and thereafter transform them onto
this DVD to produce moving images, which will be played for you ....
... This computer-generated animation is a demonstrative exhibit, not
substantive evidence, and it is being offered solely as an illustration of
the Commonwealth's version of events as recreated by Dr. Gary Ross
and Trooper Brad Beach.
Id. at 1186.
182. Id. at 1189-90.
183. For example, compare Figure 1 with Figure 3. Because Figure 3 con-
tains less detail, there is less need to make the type of arbitrary assumptions
necessary to fill in details in an animation such as the one shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Diagram prepared by Trooper Beach depicting his opinion
in Serge related to the relative positions of the defendant and the victim
when the second shot struck the victim.'84
B. Hearsay and Other "Otherwise Inadmissible" Evidence
In some cases, there may be sufficient facts or data to
support an expert opinion, but the expert is not permitted to
testify about the evidence because they are "otherwise inad-
missible."'85 An expert may not testify about evidence that is
otherwise inadmissible unless the court finds that the proba-
tive value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger
of unfair prejudice. 8 6 The same should apply to an expert's
nonverbal testimony offered through a computer animation or
other form of demonstrative evidence. Unless the court finds
that the probative value of the evidence substantially out-
weighs the danger of unfair prejudice, the otherwise inadmis-
sible evidence should not be included in a computer anima-
tion.
184. Brief of Appellant with Apps. at App. D, Commonwealth v. Serge, 896
A.2d 1170, (Pa. 2006) (No. 150 MAP2004). As shown in the animation, this was
the third shot fired by the defendant; the second shot missed the victim entirely.
See Forensic Animations, supra note 150.
185. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
186. Id.
[Vol. 52
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When evidence is otherwise inadmissible, it is often hear-
say. Hearsay is a statement made outside of court offered "to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. " 187 This is a particular
concern with demonstrative evidence because exhibits often
contain depictions based on information provided by someone
other than the testifying witness. When a witness couches for
the accuracy of the exhibit, it is often unclear whether the
witness is claiming to have first-hand knowledge of every-
thing depicted, or whether the witness is relying on informa-
tion provided by another source. If it is the later, the exhibit
contains hearsay.
Suppose an expert in an automobile accident case has
based an opinion in part on an eyewitness statement that the
traffic light was green at the time of the accident. The eye-
witness never testifies at trial and no hearsay exception ap-
plies to the out-of-court statement. That out-of-court state-
ment is otherwise inadmissible. The expert should not be
permitted to testify verbally that the light was green. Nor
should the expert be permitted to testify to that fact nonver-
bally by showing a green light in a demonstrative exhibit.
C. Relevance and Danger of Unfair Prejudice
The relevance of demonstrative evidence is determined in
the same manner as any other form of witness testimony. Ev-
idence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." 18 The probative value of the evidence,
however, must be balanced against other considerations.
Relevant evidence may be excluded on the grounds that "the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the ju-
ry, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulatiye evidence."8 9
To illustrate how this balance applies to nonverbal testi-
mony, consider the testimony of an eyewitness to an automo-
bile accident. The appearance of the scene of the accident is
relevant and, therefore, the eyewitness is allowed to testify
187. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
188. FED. R. EVID. 401.
189. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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about it. Some aspects of the scene, however, may have very
little probative value, yet pose a danger of unfair prejudice.
Suppose that the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was neg-
ligent in causing the accident because he was speeding. And
suppose further, that the plaintiff claims that there was a
playground on the corner nearest the accident, but concedes
that the playground had nothing to do with what caused the
accident. The judge may rule that the danger of unfair preju-
dice posed by the evidence regarding the playground substan-
tially outweighs its probative value and preclude the eyewit-
ness from testifying about it. The same considerations should
apply if the eyewitness describes the scene through a photo-
graph instead.190
This balance also applies to expert testimony. Although
experts are permitted to testify to facts outside their personal
knowledge, the probative value of the testimony is measured
by its relevance to permissible expert opinions. 191 In Serge,
for example, the computer animation depicts the clothing that
the defendant and the victim were wearing at the time of the
shooting. (See Figures 2 and 3.) The defendant is wearing a
red plaid hunting jacket and the victim is wearing spotted pa-
jamas. 192 This imagery reinforced the prosecution's case the-
ory that the defendant (dressed as a hunter) came home with
the intention of shooting his wife and that his wife (dressed
for bed) was not the aggressor.1 93 But the clothing had little
190. The balancing may produce a different outcome due to the difference be-
tween showing a photograph and describing everything in it. Because using a
photograph saves the time it would take the witness to describe the scene in
more detail, the court may be more inclined to admit it even if some aspects of it
pose a danger of unfair prejudice.
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that expert testimony was admissible because it was relevant to a fac-
tual matter in the case).
192. Forensic Animations, supra note 150.
193. The defendant made a similar argument about the impact of such im-
agery in his brief to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
[Tihe human face ... always carries with it an expression, even when
presented in blank stare. Here, the Defendant's facial expression, while
portrayed as shooting the Decedent, was recreated to appear cold and
callous. So often, it is the appearance of an individual as being cold and
callous, and sometimes the most innocuous appearance, that impas-
sions individuals to develop and hold opinions, right or wrong, as to the
character of the individual portrayed. Defendant was portrayed as an
emotionless executioner, as cold as the expression on his face to bolster
the Commonwealth's theory that the Defendant had the actual specific
intent and malice.
[Vol. 52140
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probative value to the expert opinions the animation was in-
tended to illustrate. Therefore, the prosecution should not
have been permitted to include the clothing in the animation.
Aside from the contents, a danger of unfair prejudice may
also stem from the mode of presentation. There has long been
a concern that there is an inherent danger of unfair prejudice
when it comes to demonstrative evidence generally. Wigmore
noted that "a material object . . . always tends to impress the
mind unconsciously, upon the bare sight of it, with the verity
of its purport."'94 Nevertheless, if the opposing party con-
tends that a visual representation of the witness's testimony,
either in whole or in part, would pose a danger of unfair prej-
udice, an objection should be lodged pursuant to Rule 403.1"
Another source of potential unfair prejudice is the inabil-
ity of the opponent to cross-examine non-verbal testimony. If
a witness can more effectively communicate certain informa-
tion to the jury by reference to a demonstrative exhibit, it fol-
lows that the cross-examination of that witness, if limited to
verbal testimony, will be less effective than the nonverbal tes-
timony given on direct. In Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking
Brief of Appellant with Apps. at 35, Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170 (Pa.
2006) (No. 150 MAP2004).
194. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 790 at 893. But see Borelli, supra note 19, at
455-56 (arguing that jurors are capable of following instructions to consider
demonstrative evidence for what it is worth); Galves, supra note 18, at 218-19
(arguing that jurors are so accustomed to computer generated graphics that it is
unlikely that they will mistake a computer animation for reality).
195. Although it is often presumed that jurors will believe what the computer
animation shows simply because they have seen it, there is insufficient empiri-
cal data to draw any reliable conclusions on that issue. Bennett et al., Seeing Is
Believing, Or Is It? An Empirical Study of Computer Simulations as Evidence,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 257, 285-87 (1999). In that study, two sets of juries
heard a hypothetical civil trial arising from an automobile accident. Id. at 267-
70. The defendant truck driver allegedly crested a vertical curve then struck
the plaintiffs car as she was pulling onto the roadway. Id. at 269. The posted
speed limit was 55 mph, but there was an advisory sign on the upside of the hill
that recommended that the driver reduce speed to 40 mph. Id. The law of the
jurisdiction did not require the driver to reduce speed. Id. at 269 n.46. In addi-
tion to the truck driver, the state was also named as a defendant for negligent
construction of the roadway. Id. at 269. In one set of trials, the plaintiffs acci-
dent reconstruction expert used a computer animation to show that the defen-
dant would have missed plaintiff by quite a bit had he slowed to 40 mph as rec-
ommended by the sign on the upside of the hill. Id. at 272. In other set of
trials, the plaintiffs expert used photos in place of the animation. The authors
found no statistically significant relationship between seeing a computer anima-
tion and the verdict, either in terms of the apportionment of fault or the meas-
ure of damages. Id. at 277-85.
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Inc. ,196 the court was mindful of the plight of the cross-
examiner when seeking to discredit nonverbal testimony giv-
en on direct.1 97 Racz involved an automobile accident be-
tween a car and a tractor trailer, both moving in the same di-
rection in adjacent lanes.1 98 The plaintiff alleged that the
back wheels of the defendant's tractor-trailer entered the lane
with the decedent's car, thus causing the decedent to lose con-
trol of her car.199 The defendant prepared a computer anima-
tion based on the opinions of the defendant's accident recon-
struction expert.200 The expert had concluded that the wheels
of the tractor-trailer did not enter the car's lane, disregarding
deposition testimony of a passenger in the car who claimed he
saw the trailer come into their lane.2"' In deciding to exclude
the animation, the court noted that "[ilt would be an inordi-
nately difficult task" to cross-examine the expert and estab-
lish that, if the trailer did in fact cross into the decedent's
lane, the accident would have occurred differently than de-
picted in the animation. 02 The defendant's expert had the
196. 1994 WL 124857 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994).
197. Id. at *5.
198. Id. at *1.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *5.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 810-11; see also Spyrka v. County of Cook, 851 N.E.2d 800, 810
(Ill. App. 2006). (holding that the trial court erred in admitting a computer ani-
mation that depicted clotting blood cells). One of the plaintiffs experts opined
that the decedent's cause of death was a blood clot that was allowed to increase
in size because the defendant doctor discontinued the anticoagulant Heparin.
Id. at 804. The expert used a computer animation of a blood clot forming to ex-
plain his testimony. Id. at 806. On cross-examination, the expert conceded that
the animation did not necessarily depict what actually happened to the dece-
dent. Id. at 807, 811. He acknowledged that there was evidence that a clot had
existed before Heparin was discontinued and that he "did not know how much
clot was in her lung prior to the fatal embolism." Id. Despite the uncertainty as
to whether the animation depicted what actually happened inside the dece-
dent's blood vessels, the animation would still seem to be relevant under either
the illustrative purposes theory or the nonverbal testimony theory. If expert
testimony regarding how a blood clot generally causes an embolism is relevant,
and one would think that it is, a graphic representation of that testimony would
be equally relevant. Nevertheless, the court appears to have been concerned
about the net impact of the animation after what appears to be an excellent
verbal cross-examination. According to the court, "the jury had already seen the
prejudicial video at that point." Id. at 811. Thus, the problem appears to be
that the verbal cross-examination was simply no match for the computer anima-
tion because the cross-examiner was not able to visually depict the pre-existing
blood clot and how that, not the absence of Heparin, may have caused the embo-
lism.
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unfair advantage of being able to use the animation to show
the jury how he believed the accident occurred. Unless the
animation could be altered based on testimony elicited on
cross-examination, the plaintiff was unable to show the jury
its version of how the accident occurred.2 °3
CONCLUSION
In 1990, the television franchise credited with anticipat-
ing the invention of the cellular phone and the MRI scanner
204
gave us a glimpse at the courtroom of the future.20 5 For any-
one who values our adversary system, the portrayal is noth-
ing short of apocalyptic. The story involves an extradition
hearing held aboard a twenty fourth century space ship. A
member of the crew had been charged with murder and the
hearing turned on genuine issues of fact. Nevertheless, no
witnesses swore to tell the truth, no evidentiary foundations
were laid, and no witnesses were cross-examined. Instead,
the hearing consisted of competing animated re-creations of
an event, created by the ship's computer, each with "a nomi-
nal eight-point-seven percent margin of error."
2 6
This scenario is not that far-fetched. If courts continue to
allow litigants to present computer animations that illustrate
case theories, the line between evidence and argument will
continue to be blurred, and trials will not be based on which
party has the evidence, but rather which party put on the bet-
ter show. Our adversary system, which depends on the gath-
ering, producing, and testing of evidence, will suffer.
Despite the potential for its abuse, demonstrative evi-
dence adds tremendous value to our adversary system. As
Alexander Jason recognized nearly twenty years ago, and as
Wigmore recognized more than a century ago, witnesses are
often able to express themselves better through demonstra-
203. It is not enough that the plaintiff could have offered a competing anima-
tion, either in its case in chief, or as rebuttal to the expert's testimony. The
plaintiff should be able to confront the defendant's expert on cross-examination,
forcing that expert to acknowledge how changes in an animation's underlying
premises would affect the conclusions reached.
204. Jeff Bertolucci, Star Trek Tech We Use Today (Almost), PCWORLD, May
4, 2009, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/164195/star-trek-tech_
we usetoday-almost.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
205. Star Trek: The Next Generation: A Matter of Perspective (Paramount
Television 1990).
206. Id.
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tive evidence than through words. Demonstrative evidence
should continue to play an increasingly important role in our
adversary system. And, as demonstrative evidence continues
to evolve, courts must be careful that it is serving its proper
role as nonverbal testimony, and apply the same evidentiary
standards that apply to testimonial evidence.
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